



PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS OF ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES AND




LEAD Journal (Law, Environment and Development Journal)
is a peer-reviewed academic publication based in New Delhi and London and jointly managed by the
Law, Environment and Development Centre of  SOAS University of  London
and the International Environmental Law Research Centre (IELRC).
LEAD is published at www.lead-journal.org
info@lead-journal.org
ISSN 1746-5893
This document can be cited as
Gerd Winter, ‘Problems and Solutions of Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing: 
A Theoretical Perspective - Part I’,
17/1 Law, Environment and Development Journal (2021), p. 72,
available at http://www.lead-journal.org/content/a1705.pdf
Gerd Winter, Professor of  Public Law, Research Unit for European Environmental Law (FEU), University of
Bremen, Email: gwinter@uni-bremen.de
Published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International Unported License
* Part II of this article will be published in Volume 17/2, and is available as advance publication at: http://
www.lead-journal.org/content/a1706.pdf.
** My sincerest thanks to the three reviewers of my submission who corrected mistakes and provided advice   with
outstanding effort and expertise. Needless to say that the remaining flaws are mine.
ARTICLE
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS OF ACCESS TO







2.1 The Definition of  Utilisation: Too Narrow, Too Broad? 75
2.2 R&D for Private Gain or for the Public Domain? 77
2.3 Multi-contributions to the Development of Products: When Should
there be a Cut-off ? 78
2.4 Derivatives: How to Link with Genetic Resources? 79
2.5 Digital Sequence Information: Volatile or Enclosed? 79
2.6 The Benefit Sharing Monitoring Gap: Unjustifiable but Realistic? 81
2.7 Transboundary Genetic Resources: Take All Benefits or Share? 82
2.8 Transboundary R&D Conditions: Take All Benefits or Share?
Public Funding for Private Gain? 82
2.9 Transaction Burdens and Costs: Necessary or Inefficient? 82





The regime called access to genetic resources and benefit
sharing (ABS) is based on the principle of sovereign
rights of states over their biological resources. The
principle was acknowledged by Article 3 of the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) of 1992
and by its Art. 15 extended to genetic resources. In
Article 2 ‘genetic resources’ (GR) is defined as ‘genetic
material of actual or potential value’, and ‘genetic
material’ as ‘any material of plant, animal, microbial or
other origin containing functional units of heredity’.
According to Art. 15 (1) and (7) the Contracting States
are authorized to determine access to their genetic
resources and obligated to aim at ‘sharing in a fair and
equitable way the results of research and development
and the benefits arising from the commercial and other
utilisation of genetic resources with the Contracting
Party providing such resources’.
This framework was further concretized by the Nagoya
Protocol (NP) of 2010. The NP defines the scope of
application to be access for utilisation (i.e. research and
development), empowers states providing GR
(provider states) to require prior informed consent
(PIC) and mutually agreed terms (MAT) for access to
their GR , ask them to provide for legal certainty of
relevant domestic regulation, require users to seek PIC
of indigenous and local communities if accessing
traditional knowledge associated with GR or GR for
which such communities have the established right to
grant access, obliges users of GR to share benefits
arising from the utilisation of GR with the provider
state and share benefits arising from the utilisation of
GR and associated traditional knowledge held by
indigenous and local communities  with the same,
and asks states hosting users of GR to ensure
compliance with access regulation of provider states.
In terms of regulatory tasks all this means that states
may regulate access if intending to make use of their
sovereign right over their GR, and they must regulate
utilisations performed within their jurisdiction of GR
accessed in provider state countries. Of course, both
issues can be – and usually is - contained in one and
the same law so that one better speaks of states in
their capacity as provider and/or user state.
The ABS national regimes have meanwhile taken quite
differentiated forms concerning both the provider and
user functions. An example for a sophisticated form
for provider functions is the Brazilian regime.1 Its
characteristics are: the access regime covers not only
genetic material but also genetic information; R&D
on GR acquired as commodities are also categorized
as access, even if conducted in a foreign country;  foreign
users must cooperate with domestic researchers; non-
commercial research and development (R&D) must
first be registered; notification and presentation of
mutually agreed terms (MAT) are required if
commercialisation of finished products or
reproductive material is planned; domestic proxies of
foreign users can be made liable for sharing benefits;
special scrutiny is applied concerning access to
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources
(aTK); incoming revenue is earmarked for nature
conservation and/or local/indigenous communities.
On the side of user compliance the EU probably has
the most developed regime.2 Its characteristics include:
users of GR are subject to basic duties to ensure
compliance with provider state requirements concerning
access to the GR and aTK, utilisation, marketing and
sharing of benefits arising from utilisation; due
diligence declarations are to be submitted by users
about lawful access at stages of research funding and
premarketing; competent authorities have to check the
lawfulness of access and utilisation; simplified
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1 Law 13.123 of 20 May 2015 (Access and Benefits Sharing
of  Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional
knowledge) <www.wipo.int/news/en/wipolex/2015/
article_0014.html>.
2 The core legal act is Regulation (EU) 511/2014 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April
2014 on compliance measures for users from the Nagoya
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their
Utilisation in the Union, [2014] OJ L 150/59. More
specific guidance is offered by the European
Commission in its Guidance document on the scope
of application and core obligations of Regulation (EU)
No 511/2014 [...] [2021] OJ C 13/01, hereafter referred
to as Commission Guidance (2021).
procedures are foreseen for acquisitions of GR from
registered collections.
As a further component of implementing the NP the
support for ABS transactions was established at the
international level through the ABS Clearing House
(ABSCH) which operates a database storing  national
legislation, national responsible authorities and
individual access permits, such registered permits
serving as internationally recognized certificate of
compliance.3
In spite of this major progress in regime building
there are a number of still unsolved problems. They
will first be presented. Second, the reasons why so
many problems remain unsolved shall be reflected,
and in particular whether underlying principles of
equitable sharing of advantages between parties have
been disregarded. Third, building on such reflection
and keeping additional criteria in mind a number of




The following problems shall now be explained in
turn: the definition of utilisation, the distinction
between commercial and non-commercial utilisation,
multiplicity of GR in final products, the range of
derivatives, the treatment of digital sequence
information, the enforcement of benefit sharing,
transaction costs on both the provider and user side,
the transboundary occurrence of GR, burden sharing
between research institutions and industry, and
traditional knowledge associated with GR.
2.1 The Definition of Utilisation:
Too Narrow, Too Broad?
The material scope of ABS regimes is, among others,
framed by the notion ‘access to genetic resources for
their utilisation’ (Art. 6 NP). Although the term ‘access’
alludes to the physical taking or purchase of samples
some legal systems extend it to include situations where
an organism that was bought for consumption
subsequently becomes object of  R&D.5 The EU
approach is to categorise the change as R&D which is
also somewhat strange because it would imply that
non-accessed GR are utilized.6
 Some more difficulties arise from the scope delineated
by ‘genetic resources’. Although the term is legally
defined7 there is a need to draw lines such as, for
instance, with regard to GR associated to accessed GR,
human microbiota, alien species, etc. But they can be
found and have reasonably been laid out by the
Commission Guidance (2021).  A still debatable
question is how the terms ‘genetic resources’ and
‘biological resources’ relate to each other but that can
be solved too.8
An unresolved issue however is the definition of
utilisation. While Art. 2(c) NP defines it as ‘to conduct
research and development on the genetic and/or
biochemical composition of genetic resources,
including through the application of biotechnology’
it is not determined what research and development
means. It is widely agreed that there is no precise line
between research and development, but that they may
overlap, and anyway that they do not need to come
together, but that, for instance, research without
development – often called basic - is also utilisation.
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3  Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their
Utilization, Nagoya, 29 October 2010, UN Doc. UNEP/
CBD/COP/DEC/X/1, art. 14 [hereafter NP].
4  ‘Problem’ is simply meant to be an issue inciting further
study. See its Greek origin in ‘pro’ = before and ‘ballein’
= to throw, hence something thrown before someone.
5  See, for instance, Art. 2 VIII of the Brazilian Law 13.123
which defines ‘access’ to include research and
development which is surprising because R&D in the
NP sense means utilisation.
6  Commission Guidance (2021) (n 2) para 3.4.
7  Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5
June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79, Art. 2 [hereafter CBD].
8  While ‘genetic resources’ refers to the genetic program,
‘biological resources’ is rather used in relation to
organisms as phenotypes, such as if they are stored in a
collection, traded as commodity, etc.
However, it is unclear what the actual content of
research and development shall be. The Commission
Guidance proposes a ‘litmus test’ which is whether
the R&D ‘creates new insight into characteristics of
the genetic resource which is of (potential) benefit to
the further process of product development’.9 It is
thus the ‘new insight’, and one regarding the genetic
program that is considered as decisive.
According to the Commission this shall exclude from
scope a vast number of activities, including
• the taxonomic identification of genetic
material by morphological or molecular
analysis,
• the sequencing of genomes,
• use of GR as testing or reference tools,
• the processing of GR for incorporation in a
product where its properties are already
known (such as, for example, the processing
of  Aloe Vera for incorporation into
cosmetics),
• the storing of GR in collections and related
assessment of their health,
• the rearing and culturing of GR (such as farm
animals),
• trading, transfer and exchange of GR and
related knowledge, unless the material has
been transformed into a ‘half product’,
• discovery and description of new species, as
long as this is done without additional
research on the genetic and/or biochemical
composition of the genetic resources to
discover or making use of the properties
(functions) of the genes,
• the description and documentation of the
distinctive nature or features of GR, unless
this is combined with research on specific
properties of the GR,
• phylogenetic analysis,
• large scale screening except for research on
selected genetic information,
• behavioural studies on GR (e.g. to find out
about their biocontrol properties) unless the
genetic influence on behaviour is explored,
• vectors used to introduce foreign material
into host organisms unless new knowledge
about the vector is created,
• GR exploited to produce active compounds
for further use,
• the use of invariant laboratory strains as a
model for research,
• crossing and selection of GR for maintenance
and conservation of  breeds and varieties,
• known reproductive technologies,
• use of plant varieties legally protected by
plant variety rights, registers or listings,
• the processing of known GR for subsequent
incorporation in a product,
• formulation of a product by mixing or
adding known ingredients or compounds,
• the testing of products unless the test results
are used to modify the product.10
A note on definition theory may be appropriate here:
Terms should be defined with a view on contexts and
purpose rather than with regard to general dictionary
wisdom. Reference to a dictionary is however how the
EU Commission proceeds. It also refers to the OECD
Frascati Manual which formally standardizes terms for
statistics.11
Looking therefore at context and purpose the litmus
test would be appropriate if the NP primarily aimed
at promoting the progress of biological sciences.
However, its objective is rather to find a compromise
between the interests of provider states and users
(including their states), based on the acceptance of
sovereign rights of provider states. Such compromise
can rather be found by creating and sharing benefits,
be they non-monetary or monetary. Therefore, in that
line the definition of research and development would
be broader including some of those activities that are
auxiliary to the core R&D process, such as the
sequencing of genomes, molecular analysis, taxonomic
research, introduction of (known) genes into other
organisms, etc.
Law, Environment and Development Journal
76
10 Compiled from Commission Guidance (2021) (n 2) para
2.3.3.2. and Annex II.
11 OECD, Frascati Manual 2015. Guidelines for collecting
and reporting data on research and experimental
development. The measurement of scientific,
technological and innovation activities (OECD
Publishing 2015) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
9789264239012-en>.9   Commission Guidance (2021) (n 2) para. 2.3.3.1.
In conclusion the ‘litmus test’ proposed by the EU
Commission tends to privilege user over provider
interests and may drive provider states to exaggerate
PIC and MAT conditions in order to draw some of
the excluded items back into scope. The result would
be a patchwork of different requirements that makes
the tracing back of benefits overly complicated.
Provider states setting strict conditions would also be
exposed to jurisdiction shopping by users so that their
sovereign rights run void. We are therefore confronted
with the problem that strict requirements strangulate
user freedoms, weak requirements frustrate provider
interests, and differentiated requirements are difficult
to implement.
2.2 R&D for Private Gain or for
the Public Domain?
More problems arise concerning the handling of
material or information resulting from the utilisation
of  GR. Two questions stand out: should the results
be published or allowed to be kept private, and should
they be commercialised or allowed for free use?
Concerning publication the CBD has various provision
advocating the enhancement of public knowledge
about GR and their sustainable use12 while the NP
does not address the issue directly. On the other hand
the sovereign rights of provider states include that the
the states  are free to hinder the publication of R&D
research results.
Concerning commercialisation the CBD and NP
introduce the term commercial in two contexts. One
is related to R&D activities: Art. 8 (b) NP asks for
simplified access procedures for research with non-
commercial intention. Likewise, Art. 17 (4) (i) NP lists
commercial or non-commercial uses as possible
content of the internationally recognized certificate of
compliance (IRCC). The other context is the bringing
on the market (or not) of  products13 from R&D, which
is called commercialisation (or not) of products. This
is referred to as a final step of handling GR (Art. 5 (1)
NP, Art. 15 (7) CBD), and as an activity that shall be
supervised by checkpoints (Art. 17 (1) (iv) NP.14
The problems of publication and commercial use are
obviously interrelated. Commercialisation frequently
implies to keep the result secret in order to exclude
competitors, or to obtain intellectual property
protection which makes the R&D result public but
restricts its use. In contrast, free use is frequently based
on published material or information.15
This interrelation leads to practical conflicts of interest.
For instance, users in the public sphere normally wish
to publish their results, possibly even including
commercialisable ones, while the provider state may
rather wish to keep them secret in order not to
jeopardise subsequent commercialisation. In contrast,
users in the private sphere are normally interested in
holding them secret until they are brought to the
market, or in restricting their further use through
intellectual property protection, while provider states
may be interested in making results public in order to
build up domestic R&D capacity or generally participate
in the global research commons.
Neither the CBD nor the NP nor even national 
implementing legislation provide guidance for such 
conflicts. Concrete provisions how to solve such 
conflicts are largely lacking. There is only a weak 
admonition in Art. 8 (b) NP to facilitate non-
commercial research which by implication will be 
published. Even the core terms – publication, 
commercial/non-commercial – are hardly ever
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12  CBD (n 7) Arts. 7, 12, 13, 15 (6), 17.
13 Corresponding to common definitions (OECD 2015 (n
11) the term product is here used to cover goods and
services.
14 For a national implementation see EU Regulation 511/
2014, Art. 3 (6) and 4 (3) (b) (iv). See also the preambular
considerations Nos. 3 and 6.
15 See the definition proposed by DFG, Model clauses for
mutually agreed terms on access to genetic resources
and benefit sharing, DFG 2021, which is: ‘“Utilisation
for non-commercial purposes” means research and
development that aims at enhancing knowledge about
the accessed genetic resource, including products and
processes developed therefrom, and making such
knowledge publicly available and usable at no more
than incremental cost for dissemination’.
added), and that fairness and equity do demand the
sharing of benefits.17 The situation is different if the
original trait and its function are still noticeable in the
final product. As a solution cut-off criteria might be
used that draw a line between what has disappeared
and what is still noticeable. This could be tried by a
quantitative criterion such as, for instance, a minimum
percentage of an original genome in the final product.
But often a highly important property originates from
a much smaller percentage, and unimportant functions
may be due to larger ones. One could use a qualitative
criterion instead, such as whether a trait is present in
the finished product and determinant to its functional
characteristics.18 But that is hardly operational in
borderline cases.
Another solution would be to draw a line at the stage
of the marketing of a product. While the revenue
obtained would be subject to benefit sharing R&D on
the finished product would not be utilisation of the
original GR and thus be out of scope. For instance, a
new plant variety bred from accessed GR and marketed
would be subject to benefit sharing, while the further
breeding of a subsequent variety developed from the
first would be considered to be cut off from the original
traits.19 But why should traits and properties that are
still influential in the subsequent product be set aside
only because a new variety has been generated? It may
be new in terms of plant variety Protection law but
ABS does not protect intellectual ingenuity. It rewards
the conservation of  GR, and that is not overruled by
intellectual efforts.
A further problem of multi-causality is that the
different products emerging from the chain of
breeding will belong to all states which possess them
in in-situ conditions, i.e. in ‘surroundings where they
have developed their distinctive properties’.20  This
can be many states which makes it difficult for the
provider of some trait to trace marketing and claim
benefit sharing.
defined.16  Absent guidance by international or national
law the matter is largely left to the negotiations and
finally PIC and MAT conditions between provider
states and users, and thus to the de facto bargaining
power of the two parties. The outcome may be to the
disadvantage of provider states, or users, or the general
public interest in open and non-commercial research
contributing to the conservation of  biodiversity.
2.3 Multi-contributions to the
Development of Products: When
Should There be a Cut-off?
R&D processes on genetic resources can embrace long
chains and networks of activities and involve a
multitude of different genetic resources. This is
particularly evident in animal and plant breeding where
multiple stages of reproduction may diminish the
influence of an original contribution as compared with
multiple other traits flowing into the product. In such
case, it can be doubted that there is still a ‘benefit arising
from the utilisation of genetic resources’ (emphasis
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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16  For an exception see the comprehensive definition of
commercialisation see Art. 1 (1) of the South African
National Environment Management Laws Act, 2004, as
amended by Act No 14 of 2013: ‘commercialisation, in
relation to indigenous biological resources, includes
the following activities: (a) the filing of any complete
intellectual property application, whether in South
Africa or elsewhere; (b) obtaining  or  transferring  any
intellectual  property  rights  or  other rights; (c)
commencing product development, including the
conducting of market research and seeking pre-market
approval for the sale of resulting products; (d) the
multiplication of indigenous biological   resources
through cultivation, propagation, cloning or other
means to develop and produce products, such as drugs,
industrial enzymes, food flavours, fragrances, cosmetics,
emulsifiers, oleoresins, colours ex-tracts and essential
oils; (e)trading  in  and  exporting of indigenous
biological resources to develop and produce  products,
such as drugs, industry enzymes, food  flavours,
fragrances,  cosmetics, emulsifiers, oleoresins, colours,
extracts and essential oils; and (f) commercial
exploitation;’’ See further von C von Kries and G
Winter, ‘Defining Commercial and Non-commercial
Research and Development under the Nagoya Protocol
and in other Contexts’ in E C Kamau, G Winter and P-
T Stoll (eds),  Research and Development on Genetic
Resources. Public Domain Approaches in Implementing
the Nagoya Protocol (Routledge 2015) 60-74.
17  Cf. NP (n 3) Art. 5.
18  Similar Art. 17 of the Brazilian Act 13.321 of 20.05.2015
which states: ‘In the case of a finished product, the
genetic heritage or the associated traditional knowledge
component must be one of the key elements of value
adding to the product, in accordance with this Act’.
19  Commission Guidance (2021) (n 2) para. 8.4.
20  Cf. NP (n 3) Art. 2 paras. 4 and 12.
In conclusion, one more problem emerges, namely
the need but difficulty to determine and trace the
specific contribution of accessed GR in cases of multi-
causality of product development.
2.4  Derivatives: How to Link with
Genetic Resources?
According to Art. 2 (e) NP derivate means ‘a naturally
occurring biochemical compound resulting from the
genetic expression or metabolism of biological or
genetic resources, even if it does not contain functional
units of heredity’.
It is clear that not any chemical compound but only
one that originates from GR qualifies as derivative.
However, there is uncertainty as to whether R&D on a
derivative is utilisation and thus in scope of related
obligations. Art. 2 (d) and (c) NP can be read to mean
that R&D must be part of utilisation of GR. In that
line Regulation (EU) 511/2014 does not address R&D
on derivatives as an independent activity. The
Commission Guidance (2021) specifies this
postulating a ‘continuity’ of R&D on the derivative
with R&D on the genetic resource.21 Such ‘combined
access’ excludes from scope the acquisition of a
derivative for research on the same derivative without
reach to the genetic origin. However, Art. 2 NP could
as well be understood to just require a link between
R&D on the biochemical compound and existing
knowledge about its genetic origin. Imagine a chemical
compound deriving from a GR is found to have high
pharmaceutical value: should that be out of scope if
the user has not combined her chemical research with
research on the genetic resource? This would appear to
me to discriminate against provider state interests and
disregard that such derivative utilisation has been
exemplary cases of biopiracy in the run-up of
international and national ABS law-making.
2.5 Digital Sequence Informa-
tion: Volatile or Enclosed?
It has become common practice to sequence the
genome of an organism and upload the resulting data
to databases. Most of these are publicly accessible so
that anyone can download the information, do their
own research, synthesise genes and develop their own
products. Such information is called digital sequence
information (DSI). Rohden et al, drawing on proposal
of  a CBD Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group (AHTEG)
suggest to subdivide DSI to contain nucleic sequence
data (NSD) and subsidiary information (SI). NSD
refers to the nucleic acid sequence reads and the
associated data plus information on the sequence
assembly, its annotation and genetic mapping, while
SI is information on, inter alia, gene expression,
ecological and abiotic relationships, functions,
morphology and phenotype, taxonomy and
modalities of use.22
Some provider states have included information on
genetic resources in their definition of genetic (or
biological) resources.23  This is, for instance, the case
in South Africa where ‘genetic resources’ is defined to
include ‘(a) any genetic material; (b) the genetic
potential, characteristics of information of any
species’.24  Concerning the ABS-regime for
bioprospection this requires that a permit must be
obtained for R&D not only on genetic material but
also on information about it.
Such claims could be understood to stipulate a new
kind of intellectual property right, one, so to speak, in
‘wild’ information as opposed to ‘invented’
information as required by patent law.  However, such
exclusive right would hardly be supported neither by
Art. 15 CBD nor Art. 5 NP which after all speak of
material, not information as object of sovereign
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21  Commission Guidance (2021) (n 2) para. 2.3.4.
22 F Rohden and others, ‘Combined Study on DSI in
Public and Private Databases and DSI Traceability’ (2019)
< h t t p s : / / w w w. c b d . i n t / a b s / D S I - p e e r / S t u d y -
Traceability-databases.pdf>.
23  For an overview see M Bagley and others, ‘Fact-finding
Study on how Domestic Measures Address Benefit-
Sharing Arising from Commercial and Non-
commercial Use of Digital Sequence Information on
Genetic Resources and Address the Use of Digital
Sequence Information on Genetic Resources and
Address the Use of Digital Sequence Information on
Genetic Resources for Research and Development’
(2020) 31 et seq <www.cbd.int/doc/c/428d/017b/
1b0c60b47af50c81a1a34d52/dsi-ahteg-2020-01-05-
en.pdf>.
24  Art. 1 ((1) Act No. 10 of  2004: National Environmental
Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004, as amended by
Act No. 14 of  2013: National Environment Management
Laws Act, 2013.
rights.25 While based on their sovereignty provider
states may well introduce new IPRs, but for a
transborder reach involving acceptance and enforcement
by other states an international treaty would have to
be established like the Paris Convention for the
Protection of  Industrial Property.26
This, however, does not exclude that a less
sophisticated version of property is conceived. It
should first of all be clear about the notion of
information. Information is opposed to material. It
is the result of cognition and explanation of material.
Material although ‘being out there’ is of no relevance
if not perceived through information. Therefore,
property in material is unavoidably property in a
described and explained object, or in short, it is property
in ‘informed’ material. Property rights therefore
intricately extend to information insofar information
describes propertied material.
If no exclusive right can be established relative rights
can. They can be specified by provider state legislation
and PIC/MAT. Such framing may shape rights and
obligations concerning reporting, publication,
Law, Environment and Development Journal
applications, commercialisation, etc.27 The undisputed
right of regulating access to GR as material can thus
serve as leverage for determining how the GR including
related information shall be used. Users are bound by
related administrative acts containing PIC and contracts
containing MAT. User states are obliged to ensure
compliance with PIC and MAT conditions at least
concerning research and development.28
The crucial question of course is to what extent such
conditions are made known and respected if DSI is
stored in open access databases and accessed by users
of the same. In order to answer that question a look
at the database landscape is needed.29 The core public
structure for research on NSD is the International
Nucleotide Sequence Database Collaboration (INSDC).
It coordinates the three largest databases: Genbank,
operated by the US National Center for Biotechnology
Information (NCB), European Nucleotide Archive
(ENA), operated by EMBL-European Bioinformatics
Institute (EBI) under the auspices of European
Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL), and DNA
Data Bank of Japan (DDBJ) which is operated by the
National Genetics Research Institute in Japan. Most
of the costs of the databases – which are substantial -
are born by the US federal government, 20 European
states and the Japanese state, respectively. INSDC with
its focus on nucleic data is surrounded by
approximately 1600 biological databases that store
scientific information on biological resources beyond
NSD and SI, but interact with INSDC. Billions of
sequences are stored at the INSDC bases, with trillions
80
25  See further on the ongoing doctrinal debate C Lawson,
F Humphries and M Rourke, ‘The Future of
Information under the CBD, Nagoya Protocol, Plant
Treaty, and PIP Framework’ (2019) 22 J World Intellect
Prop 103–119 <https://doi.org/10.1111/jwip.12118>;
T Spranger, ‘Expert Opinion on the Applicability of
the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Nagoya
Protocol to Digital Sequence Information’ Submitted
on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of
Education and Research (BMFT 2019) <https://
w w w. b m b f . d e / f i l e s / L e g a l _ o p i n i o n _ D S I _ -
Prof_Spranger_EN_BF.PDF>; Chr Lyal, ‘Digital
Sequence Information on Genetic Resources and the
Convention on Biological Diversity’ in E C Kamau
(ed), Global Transformations in the Use of  Biodiversity
for Research and Development. Post Nagoya Protocol
Implementation Amid Unresolved and Arising Issues
(Springer forthcoming). For a doctrinal discussion on
the usefulness of the distinction between exclusive
and relative intellectual property rights see Chr Godt,
‘“Data Property”: Entitlements Between “Ownership”,
Factual Control and Access to Commons’ in B
Akkermans and A Berlee (eds), “Sjef-sache”. Essays in
Honour of  Prof. Mr. Dr. J.H.M. (Sjef) van Erp on the
Occasion of His Retirement (Eleven International
Publishing forthcoming).
26  Accessible via <https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/treaties/
textdetails/12633>.
27  See for an overview of practices Bagley and others (n
23) p. 31 et seq. As an alternative construction the African
Group of Negotiators on Biodiversity to the CBD Ad
Hoc Group on Digital Sequence Information has
suggested that sequencing activities should be regarded
as utilisation of GR, which – I believe - implies that DSI
would be a result of R&D and as such contribute to
the further generation of  benefits.  Available at
<www.cbd.int/abs/DSI-views/2019/AfricanGroup-
DSI.pdf>.  For further elaboration of this classification
see K Sollberger, ‘Digital Sequence Information and
the Nagoya Protocol. Legal Expert Brief on Behalf of
the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN)’
7 April 2018 <https://www.bafu.admin.ch/bafu/de/
home/themen/biotechnologie/biotechnologie—
rechtliche-grundlagen/rechtsgutachten.html>.
28 Concerning subsequent applications and commercia-
lisation this is not (or not clearly) the case See above
chapter.
29  See Rohden and others (n 22) 17 et seq.
of DNA bases. The sequences can comprise bases
ranging from a few to millions each. Millions of
sequences are submitted per year. Researchers
submitting data to INSDC are responsible to pursue
intellectual property rights (IPRs) they may own on a
piece of information, and are liable for any damage
that may arise from uses of their data that violate
third parties’ IPRs. All data are freely accessible without
registration. 10-15 million users per year are estimated
to visit the INSDC webpages.30 Users accessing data
may make any use of them, including for publication
(although credit to author and database are to be
given), research, development, and commercialisation.
It is their responsibility to pay tribute to any IPRs
rights that may exist. The institutions maintaining
the databases disclaim any liability for violation of the
same.
As for ABS relevant information INSDC practices do
not provide means for tracing data uses back to
provider state PIC and MAT. PIC and MAT in most
countries are issued in paper form or pdf files which
can technically not be linked to INSDC entries. The
only indication of origin INSDC offers is that data
submitted shall inform about the country of origin
of the pertinent organism. But that is only
implemented in a small percentage of cases and does
not anyway allow the tracing back to possible PIC and
MAT conditions on utilisation and
commercialisation.31 The powerful trend towards
digitalisation of genetic information and its culture
of open access is therefore a major problem for the
principle of sovereign rights of provider states.
2.6  The Benefit Sharing Monitor-
ing Gap: Unjustifiable but Reali-
stic?
While utilisation of GR has attracted much legal
attention the sharing of benefits is still regulatory terra
incognita. Regulatory progress in the EU, for instance,
has been concerned with what kinds of utilisation are
within or beyond scope but not as much with ensuring
benefit sharing (BS). Still, Art. 5 (3) NP, somewhat
concretising Art. 8 (7) CBD, mandates Contracting
Parties, including user states, to take measures, ‘as
appropriate’ to ensure that benefits are shared. This
obligation of course allows states to establish
straightforward governmental monitoring and
enforcement of BS. But the NP itself is less
demanding. The user state shall ‘designate check points’
that ‘should be relevant’ ‘to the collection of relevant
information at, inter alia, any stage of [...] pre-
commercialisation and commercialisation’ (Art. 17 (1)
(a) (iv) NP), it ‘shall, as far as possible and as
appropriate, cooperate in cases of alleged violation of
domestic [...] benefit-sharing legislation’ (Art. 15 (3)
NP).
The concept chosen instead is a contractual model. It
bases the implementation of benefit sharing on
mutually agreed terms (MAT) between provider states
and individual users. If disputes arise from MAT such
as if a user refuses to share benefits the provider state
can only enforce contractual obligations seeking
recourse at user state courts, or at its own courts risking
non-recognition of decisions in user states.32
The EU in its user state function could have gone
beyond what the NP sets as a minimum standard but
did not do so, or only did so with some slight hint. It
reserves its most powerful instrument of  monitoring,
namely due diligence declarations, to the stages of
receival of research funding and of final development
of a product (Art. 7 (1 and (2) Regulation (EU) 511/
2014. It is only with some doctrinal creativity that one
can conclude from Art. 9 (1) and (2) Regulation (EU)
511/2014 that administrative bodies have powers or
even duties to supervise subsequent commercialisation
and benefit sharing.33
Provider states thus depend on their own capacities
and powers to monitor pre-commercialisation,
commercialisation and the sharing of benefits. But
states often lack the skilled human and financial
resources needed, and they do not have legal powers
of investigation and prosecution in user states.
In conclusion, concerning benefit sharing an imbalance
to the disadvantage of provider states was built into
the NP without this being predetermined by Art. 15
CBD. User states so far refuse to go further.




32  Cf NP (n 3) Art. 18 (2).
33  See for a more detailed argumentation G Winter, ‘The
ABS Compliance Regime of the European Union’ in
E C Kamau (forthcoming) (n 25).
2.7 Transboundary Genetic Res-
ources: Take All Benefits or
Share?
Genetic resources often spread over national borders.
This raises questions of justice between provider states
which may be termed the horizontal relation of justice
in distinction from the ‘vertical’ between providers and
users.34 Why should one provider state be entitled to
take all of the non-monetary and monetary benefits
although other states have also contributed to the
preservation of  the GR? Would it not lower the
benefits of all provider states taken together if they
compete for ABS accesses and are tempted to offer
conditions that are most favourable for users but least
favourable for providers?
Creating pools of GR would a way to cope with the
issue. They could be set up on the basis of Art. 11 NP
which encourages cooperation of parties where the
same genetic resources are found in situ. An early
attempt was that of the Andean Community which
however has achieved not much more than serving as
a tool to harmonize national legal regimes concerning
ABS.35 Pools for East Africa have been considered
but not yet instituted.36 The problem that one provider
state takes it all has therefore prevailed.
2.8 Transboundary R&D Condit-
ions: Take All Benefits or Share?
Public Funding for Private Gain?
Problems of ‘horizontal’ equity also appear on the
user side. Two of  them shall be mentioned: one-sided
sharing of benefits, and one-sided bearing of
utilisation costs.
One-sided sharing of benefits occurs because in the
normal case single users alone reap the benefits of
utilisation of accessed GR although drawing on
knowledge produced by many other researchers and
developers. The frame of reference of this problem is
the tension between intellectual property rights and
the public knowledge domain. There is an overall trend
towards the latter which should be kept in mind when
new options are elaborated.
One-sided bearing of costs occurs because most of
the costs of access are born by public research
institutions while the biotech industry benefits at low
cost from research results funded from public monies
and published for public access. It is also to their
advantage that the basic duties and administrative
oversight does not extend to the marketing of
products and the sharing of benefits. Therefore, hardly
any considerable revenue from sales of products or
licensing of patents has flown from industry to
provider states. In short, research is sent to the front
while industry holds itself in the background. It could
be argued that the division of labour between public
research and industry corresponds to normal practices
of modern states where research is deemed to be
publicly funded infrastructure that can freely be used
for subsequent commercial activities. But the ABS idea
may throw a different light on the issue. ABS rests on
the general conviction that biodiversity must be
conserved for the benefit of  mankind, including
industry, and that the willingness of  host states to
protect can be incentivised by benefit sharing, or more
simply, through money flowing from industrialised
uses to developing providers. Such flow is weak if the
commercial stages come later and are anyway hard to
supervise. Therefore, industry should acknowledge its
interest in and accept its responsibility for preserving
biodiversity, maybe by financial engagement already at
earlier stages of  R&D.
2.9 Transaction Burdens and
Costs: Necessary or Inefficient?
While the problems described so far are substantial in
kind, raising questions of equity between differing
partners, problems of how transactions are organised
must also be kept in mind. I have already discussed
some issues insofar as they have substantial impact
(such as, for instance, monitoring commercialisation).
Additional issues would include legal certainty,
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34 G Winter, ‘Common pools of genetic resources and
related traditional and modern knowledge’ in E C
Kamau and G Winter (eds), Common Pools of Genetic
Resources. Equity and Innovation in International
Biodiversity Law (Routledge 2013) 3-25, at 3-4. See
further Part 2 of the article.
35 M Ribadeneira Sarmiento, ‘Research on Genetic
Resources in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
Perspectives for Facilitated Access’ in Kamau, Winter
and Stoll (n 16) 131-150.
36  E C Kamau, ‘Exploring Bases for Building Common
Pools in Eastern Africa’ in Kamau and Winter (n 34)
373-398.
On the user side costs arise when R&D organisations
acquaint themselves with the ABS system, create IT
tools checking genetic resources for ABS relevance,
apply for and negotiate PIC, MAT and Material
Transfer Agreements (MTAs), where required (such
as in the EU) prepare due diligence declarations and
store relevant information for years, and possibly
employ provider state personnel for joint research
projects.
In addition, administrative costs arise for the
elaboration and dissemination of ABS information
tools, negotiation of rules harmonising EU wide
harmonisation activities, and checks of utilisation and
benefit sharing.39
As most of the R&D results generate non-monetary
benefits it is impossible to weigh them up with the
transaction costs. In any case the more differentiated
the ABS regimes are organised in order to ensure the
sharing of monetary benefits the more financial costs
will arise. Most illustrative is the blockchain model for
tracing benefits to accessed GR: it may at the end eat
up all – or even more of – the revenue they generate.
The problem is thus how to find a system that is fair
at minimal transaction costs.
2.10 Parenthesis on Traditional
Knowledge Associated with
Genetic Resources
In the preceding parts I almost completely disregarded
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources
(aTK). This is not due to any assumed unimportance
of it. On the contrary by Art. 8 (j) CBD and Arts. 7, 12
and 16 NP aTK has been laid out as a good that must
be preserved, supported and compensated if  accessed
and utilized. Many national ABS systems have also
dedicated differentiated provisions on access to the
utilisation of aTK. Discussions about reforming the
ABS regime have hardly ever lacked mention of aTK.
transparency, effectiveness, and proportionality which
all are stipulated by Arts. 6, 12 – 18 NP.
Legal certainty and transparency of transactions are of
outstanding concern for all involved partners, and
especially for researchers who have hitherto had free
access to GR apart from certain manageable
requirements of provider states concerning research
oversight, environmental protection and international
trade. ABS has exposed them to often complicated
and lengthy procedures. Any new concept will have to
come up with more practicable solutions.
Effectiveness and proportionality raise questions of
costs efficiency of designs. The new ABS requirements
have imposed a heavy administrative burden on R&D
activities. On the provider side a state operating an
ABS regime and striving for proper enforcement must
not only supervise accesses in its domestic sphere but
follow the utilisation of its accessed genetic resources
both internally and abroad, from first research activities
throughout to the final marketing of products and
the obtaining of intellectual property rights. Financial
returns of any significant size have hardly ever been
reported.37 Although monetary compensations have
been envisaged since the entering into force of the
CBD in 1993, they have rather consisted of upfront
payments or voluntary donations.38 In any case, the
transaction costs will often have been higher than the
returns. Benefits deriving from cooperation in research
and development if they emerged seem to have been
more rewarding than monetary benefits. By the way,
R&D cooperation also involves monetary gains for
the partner on the provider state side.
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37 N Pauchard, ‘Access and Benefit-Sharing under the
Convention on Biological Diversity: What Can Some
Numbers Tell Us about the Effectiveness of  the
Regulatory Regime?’ (2017) 6 Resources 11
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38 See for upfront payments J Cabrera Medaglia, ‘The Role
of the National Biodiversity Institute in the Use of
Biodiversity for Sustainable Development - Forming
Bioprospecting Partnerships’ in E C Kamau and G
Winter (eds),  Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and the Law (Earthscan 2009) pp 243-268;
for cases of voluntary payments which were made
nolens volens upon moral or political pressure see N
Pauchard, Gouverner les ressources génétiques. Les
stratégies des acteurs face aux droits de propriété et
aux règles sur l’accès et le partage des avantages (Editions
Alphil-Presses Universitaires Suisses 2020) 402-410.
39 On experiences made with ABS practices see the survey
by Milieu Analysis of implications of compliance with
the EU ABS Regulation for research organisations and
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Nevertheless, however, such mention is characterised
by a certain sanctimoniousness accompanied by wide
ignorance of what is really going on. The regulatory
scrutiny somewhat stands in contrast to that lack of
empirical knowledge and practical ingenuity.
Any reformatory reflection would need to first broaden
the knowledge base. Indepth studies are needed on
kinds of aTK, its dissemination across local
communities within and across states, its hosting by
individuals and communities, practices of access, kinds
of utilisation, and commercialisation.40 It could be
that there are only disappointingly rare cases of access
and utilisation of  the kind the CBD, NP and general
perceptions expect. This may especially be true in cases
of deep cultural gap between genuine traditional
healing and modern medicine.41 It may further be that
much of claimed traditional knowledge is already
known from anthropological research of the past. On
the other hand, it may be revealed that traditional
knowledge is more dynamic than assumed developing
at its own pace of practical experience.42 This could be
an attractive object of access and utilisation.
In conclusion the knowledge about ABS concerning
aTK is not a sufficient basis for already designing
options for reform. I will therefore desist from further
venturing into that matter.
3
CONCLUSION
Summing up the following yet unsolved problems
have been identified:
• how should utilisation be defined having in
mind the interest of researchers in freedom
of research and the interest of providers in
participating in R&D and resulting benefits
• whether R&D results should be held
confidential in order to allow commercial
gain, or made public in order to enhance the
public domain of knowledge
• what criteria are appropriate to draw a line
between relevant and irrelevant contributions
of GR in multicausal development of
products
• how R&D on derivatives can be linked to
R&D on genetic resources from which the
derivates originate
• whether public databases that store digital
sequence information can and should be
reformed to carry conditions for utilisation
and benefit sharing stipulated by provider
states
• whether and how the contractual obligation
to share benefits should be improved by
administrative oversight on the user side
• how in situations of transboundary GR the
right of one provider to take all benefits can
be integrated in a pool setting
• whether on the user side the costs and
benefits of ABS are well distributed between
public and private sector utilisation and
commercialisation
• how much the transactions in the ABS
system cost, and whether the costs are
justifiable.
There may be ways and some have been considered of
how to solve those problems without fundamentally
putting the ABS concept into question. However, the
multitude of difficulties indicates that there may be
underlying reasons that call for more basic changes of
model design. This will be discussed in the second
part of this article.43
40  See examples of that kind of study J K Githae, ‘Potential
of TK for Conventional Therapy – Prospects and
Limits’ in Kamau and Winter (n 38) 77-100; J Kleba, ‘A
Socio-legal Inquiry into the Protection of Disseminated
Traditional Knowledge – Learning from Brazilian Cases’
in Kamau and Winter (n 38) 119-142; E C Kamau,
‘Protecting TK Amid Disseminated Knowledge – A
New Task for ABS Regimes? A Kenyan Legal View’ in
Kamau and Winter (n 38) 143-172.
41  See further Githae ibid.
42   Kamau (n 40).
43  The second part will be published in Volume 17/2 and
is available as advance publication at http://www.lead-
journal.org/content/a1706.pdf'.
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